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Abstract 
 
  A number of challenges exist for genetically modified (GM) crop development at the 
production level.  Contract strategies can resolve these challenges.  Contracts can be designed to 
induce legal adoption of GM wheat by varying technology fees, violation detection, and 
penalties.  The primary objective of this research is to analyze contracting strategies to determine 
terms to minimize technology agreement violation and to induce legal adoption of GM wheat.  A 
simulation model of a crop budget for Hard Red Spring wheat was developed.  Results illustrate 
that contracts can be designed to induce desired behavior.  Technology fee, probability of 
detection, and the level of non-GM premium were the most notable factors influencing adoption 
decisions. 
 
Key Words:   Producer Decisions, Risk, Genetically Modified, Contract Terms, Wheat. 
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Highlights 
  
  The effect of contract terms on the adoption of GM wheat by producers was evaluated in 
this report.  Four different adoption scenarios were compared: no adoption, legal adoption, 
improper adoption, and illegal adoption.  A producer was assumed to choose the scenario with 
the highest expected utility of profit.  Contract terms such as technology fee, contract violation, 
and fines for violation were adjusted to determine their effect on the producer’s adoption 
decision.  Stochastic simulation was used to account for the uncertainty and risk in the analysis 
and generalized stochastic dominance was conducted to compare the choice sets.  A final 
analysis was conducted to determine the optimal technology fee when the objective is to 
maximize the technology firm’s revenue.   
 
Some important findings were: 
 
•  Producers who are more risk averse tend to avoid illegal and improper use.  Legal and no 
adoption are more appealing with more risk averse producers. 
 
•  Legal adoption is most preferred at lower technology fees.  Illegal adoption becomes 
more appealing as the technology fee increases. 
 
•  Improper use declines substantially with increased violation detection probability.  Illegal 
use is only marginally deterred with increased detection probability. 
 
•  Point-of-delivery technology rent extraction is useful in eliminating illegal use. 
 
•  Premiums for non-GM wheat deter legal adoption of GM wheat. 
 
•  Increased fines for contract violation will deter improper use substantially, but illegal use 
marginally. 
 
•  The optimal technology fee to maximize technology firm revenue subject to legal 
adoption being induced is $2.11 per acre. 
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  Agricultural biotechnology has led to substantial growth in genetically modified (GM) 
crops.  The technology, most notably gene transfer, has been implemented in a number of crops 
including corn, cotton, soybeans, and canola.  Plants are being bioengineered to be tolerant to 
herbicides that the plant is normally susceptible to.  Producers achieve benefits from lower input 
costs, convenience, quality, and yield advantages of GM crops.  Protecting intellectual property 
rights and the subsequent investment associated with technology development is important with 
these crops.  Technology firms contract mechanisms to protect their investment.  Agreements 
generally include a technology user fee and stipulate that the producer cannot keep seed for the 
following year for replanting purposes.   
  Production contracts have been used by technology companies in numerous crops such as 
corn, cotton, soybeans, and canola.  Contracts are a mechanism to monitor how many acres of a 
variety are planted.  Stewardship guidelines are outlined in contracts providing producers with 
agronomic recommendations and requirements for technology use.  Finally, contracts stipulate 
seed planting and replanting restrictions, and technology fees that the producer must pay for 
using the technology.  Technology companies design contracts to earn a return on their 
investment.   
  GM technology in wheat has not been commercialized anywhere in the world.  However, 
given that Monsanto is seeking commercialization of their genetically modified Roundup 
Ready® wheat, concerns realized in other GM crops apply to GM wheat.  Contracts will be 
necessary to alleviate some of these trepidations.  Developing contract terms to address 
segregation and other contract violations regarding GM wheat is important to the long-term 
viability of the wheat industry.   
  The purpose of this report is to analyze the impacts of contract terms for GM wheat 
inclusive of incentives to the producer, technology use rules and protocols, and randomness that 
minimizes contract abandonment while maintaining returns for the technology company and the 
producer.  Stochastic dominance is utilized to determine the effect of alternative efficient choice 
sets for growers.  The analysis also considers the problem from a technology company 
standpoint, maximizing technology fee revenue subject to the producer’s adoption decision.  
Hard red spring (HRS) wheat is the focus of this report, but this problem is applicable to all GM 
crops.   
  First, studies on contracting, pricing, and benefits of GM crops are summarized.  The 
next sections present contract mechanisms used in GM crop production.  The empirical model, 
data, and methodology are presented in the following section.  Results and summary conclude 
the report. 
                                                 
1 Former Graduate Research Assistant, Professor, and Research Scientist, respectively, in the Department of 
Agribusiness and Applied Economics, North Dakota State University, Fargo.   2
Previous Literature 
Numerous studies have been conducted that examine contracting, pricing, and benefits of 
GM crops.  Some of these are summarized below. 
Table 1.  Previous Studies on Contracting of GM Crops 
             Author  Research 
Kingwell (2000)  Incentive design in GM crops, determined 
contract terms can be adjusted to induce 
legal adoption of GM cotton. 
Giannakas (2001)  Determined pricing paths for GM seed and 
influence of government regulation of GM 
crops on technology firms’ pricing strategy. 
Kinwa-Muzinga and Mazzocco (2002)  Examined price paths of portfolio of seeds, 
determining that price of GM seeds is 
influenced by competition from other 
technologies. 
Alexander and Goodhue (1999)  Examined inter-firm competition effect on 
technology pricing. 
Holzman (2001)  Evaluated dynamic net benefits of GM 
wheat, determined that overall benefit is 
influenced by contract terms such as price. 
 
Technology providers develop contracts to protect their intellectual property and generate 
a commercial return on their research and development investment.  Returns are often in 
technology fees charged directly to the producer.  Contracts outline prices, agronomic 
stewardship recommendations, penalties, incentives, and premiums for a particular grain or 
oilseed.  The technology firm determines terms in the contract to generate a return and to induce 
growers to adopt the technology. 
  Technology firms face a risk of “piracy” by potential users (Kingwell, 2000).  Usually 
this piracy occurs due to users obtaining seed illegally by purchasing the seed on the black 
market or from users who initially purchased the seed legally but ignored replanting restrictions 
in contracts and kept their own seed.  Piracy varies across different regions and is rather extreme 
in parts of the world.  Qaim and de Janvry (2002) estimated that the actual amount of Bt cotton 
planted in Argentina in the 2001/2002 growing season was five times the official recorded 
planting area.  Their study also indicated that a lower price for the technology would not only 
increase benefits for cotton producers, but also could lead to increases in profits for the 
technology provider.  
  Technology “piracy” has resulted in a number of confrontations and challenges.  
Saskatchewan farmer Percy Schmeiser challenged Monsanto in the Canadian supreme court 
regarding a patent violation for which he was found guilty of in a lower court (Elias, 2004).  
Monsanto has implemented a mechanism to collect royalties on Roundup Ready® soybeans 
from Brazilian soybean producers, who until recently were growing Roundup Ready® soybeans 
without paying a technology fee (Farmers’ Independent Weekly, November 13, 2003).  Illegal   3
purchases of Roundup Ready® soybeans in Argentina induced Monsanto to halt sales in that 
country because of the lack of royalty collection (Gray, 2004). 
  Pricing strategies for GM technologies are critical.  Producers can be monitored but 
perfect information on their actions is nearly impossible to obtain because of cost constraints 
(Giannakas, 2001).  Kinwa-Muzinga and Mazzocco (2002) examined the prices of a portfolio of 
GM seeds.  Pricing strategies were analyzed for GM corn seed when there was competition 
between three varieties: one conventional seed, one input-trait variety, and one output-trait 
variety.  Alexander and Goodhue (1999) stressed the effect of competing products on a 
technology firm’s ability to extract profit from their product.  If producers have the option of 
growing a similar herbicide-tolerant crop from a competing firm, then the ability to charge 
monopolistic prices for the seed or technology is hindered. 
Production Mechanisms for Existing GM Grains and Oilseeds 
Technology use agreements have been adopted by major technology firms.  The notion 
behind technology use agreements is to provide long-term intellectual property right protection 
and sustainability of the GM crop or trait.  The agreements are unique to the particular product it 
represents but stewardship and technology agreements have similar principles. 
Monsanto®, Syngenta®, Dow AgroSciences®, Dupont®, BASF®, and Bayer Crop 
Science® have a direct or indirect link to GM crops.  Only the Clearfield® system from BASF is 
non-GM, but there are stacked traits in some of their varieties that designate them GM (Table 2).     
  Monsanto is one of the innovators of the technology use agreement.  The company has 
insect resistant (Bt) and herbicide tolerant (RR) cropping systems.  Stewardship guidelines are 
included in the technology use guide issued to all users.  All seed is considered GM and therefore 
is subject to the channeling and marketing restrictions associated with GM.   
  Contracts are designed with incentives to abide by the terms of the agreement.  
Monsanto’s Technology Use Agreement (TUA) stipulates that the farmer is subject to random 
checking of his fields and storage bins for up to three years following the last planting of the GM 
crop.  This is to ensure that the grower is not keeping some the seed for replanting (Kingwell, 
2000).  In some cases, Monsanto requires that only their Roundup® herbicide be applied over 
the crop for weed control purposes.  Penalties may be incurred by the producer if these rules are 
violated. 
  Most companies require that seed is not “brown bagged” or “bin run,” meaning seed 
cannot be replanted or supplied to anyone else for replanting.  Monitoring producers through 
random audits induces compliance among most producers as over 300,000 growers in the United 
States and 30,000 in Canada adhere to the contract stipulations (Agweek, May 26, 2003).  
Compliance is not just important for protecting intellectual property rights, firms also want to 
instill responsible agronomic practices for the use of their products to maintain the long-term 
viability of the technology.    
Table 2.  Technology Agreement and Stewardship Guidelines 
         
Technology 
Agreement 
Monsanto  Syngenta (NK Brand Seeds)  Dow Agrosciences  Dupont/Pioneer  BASF  Bayer Crop Science 
Yes/No  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Crops  corn, cotton, soybeans, 
canola, sugarbeets 
corn, soybeans, alfalfa  corn, sunflowers, soybeans, corn  corn, soybeans, canola, sugar  
beets, rice, sunflowers wheat 
corn, rice, canola, cotton 
Crop System  
Characteristics 
Bt, Roundup Ready®  Bt ( Knockout*), Liberty Link  Bt Corn (Herculex I Insect 
Protection), Clearfield 
Sunflower** 
Bt (YieldGard, Herculex I)  Clearfield system is a non-GM 
natural mutent selection 
herbicide tolerant system 
Liberty Link 
Refuge Zone  
Requirements (IRM) 
All Bt crops require 20% 
non-Bt in non-cotton 
growing areas and 50% in 
cotton belt in U.S.  Refuge 
zones mandated by 
Environmental Protection 
Agency.  Roundup Ready® 
crops do not have a refuge 
zone requirement.  Refuge 
must be within 1/2 mile of 
Bt corn. 
All Bt crops require 20% non-
Bt in non-cotton growing areas 
and 50% in cotton belt in U.S.  
Refuge zones mandated by 
Environmental Protection 
Agency.  Liberty Link 
herbicide system does not have 
any refuge requirements.  All 
refuge zones must be within 
1/2 mile of the Bt  crop. 
All Bt crops require 20% non-
Bt in non-cotton growing areas 
and 50% in cotton belt in U.S.  
Refuge zones mandated by 
Environmental Protection 
Agency.  Refuge must be 
within 1/2 mile of Bt corn. 
All Bt crops require 20% non-
Bt in non-cotton growing areas 
and 50% in cotton belt in U.S.  
Refuge zones mandated by 
Environmental Protection 
Agency.  Refuge must be 
within 1/2 mile of Bt corn. 
Herbicide tolerant, so no 
refuge requirements.  Some 
Clearfield products are stacked 
with other GM traits that may 
require refuge requirements. 




prohibited in non-Bt refuge 
zone unless economic 
thresholds are met.  Only 
Roundup brand herbicides 
allowed to be applied over 
Roundup Ready® crops.  
All other glyphosate brands 
are not approved and 
Monsanto disclaims all 
responsibilities. 
Insecticide applications 
prohibited in non-Bt refuge 
zone unless economic 
thresholds are met.  Liberty 
herbicide must be applied over 
Liberty Link varieties. 
Insecticide applications 
prohibitted in non-Bt refuge 
zone unless economic 
thresholds are met.   
Insecticide applications 
prohibitted in non-Bt refuge 
zone unless economic 
thresholds are met.   
Specific brand Group 2 (ALC 
inhibitors) not required but 
strongly encouraged for best 
results. 
All Liberty Link herbicides are 
tolerant to the group 10 
herbicide Liberty 
(Glufosinate), therefore only 
this herbicide may be sprayed 
on the crop. 
"Brown Bag" Policy  Seed is not allowed to be 
replanted,  supplied for 
replanting.  All planted seed  
must be purchased and 
certified from an approved 
dealer. 
Seed is not allowed to be 
replanted,  supplied for 
replanting.  All planted seed  
must be purchased certified 
from an approved dealer. 
Seed is not allowed to be 
replanted,  supplied for 
replanting.  All planted seed  
must be purchased and 
certified from an approved 
dealer. 
Seed is not allowed to be 
replanted,  supplied for 
replanting.  All planted seed  
must be purchased certified 
from an approved dealer. 
For wheat, growers must 
purchase new certified seed 
every year.   Other crops 
having similar guidelines 
established.  
All Liberty Link crops are 
hybrids so brown bagging is 
not illegal, but rarely occurs 
due to the inability of hybrids 
to reproduce effectively.  In 
"open pollinated" Liberty Link 




Grower allows Monsanto 
the right to randomly audit, 
examining farmers’ fields 
and farm to ensure  
compliance for up to 3 years 
following initial contract 
agreement.  Violation of 
this or any requirement 
could result in loss of 
technology growing rights, 
penalties, and/or fines. 
IRM plan allows Syngenta and 
its dealers the right to monitor 
farmers’ crops and farm to 
ensure compliance with IRM 
requirements or face loss of 
technology use rights and/or 
penalties and fines. 
IRM plan allows Dow Agro 
Sciences and its dealers the 
right to monitor farmers’ crops 
and farm to ensure compliance 
with IRM requirements or face 
loss of technology use rights 
and/or penalties and fines. 
IRM plan allows 
Dupont/Pioneer and their 
dealers the right to monitor 
farmers’ crops and farm to 
ensure compliance with IRM 
requirements or face loss of 
technology use rights and/or 
penalties and fines. 
No specific monitoring policy. No specific monitoring policy.
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Technology Agreement  Monsanto  Syngenta (NK Brand Seeds)  Dow Agrosciences  Dupont/Pioneer  BASF  Bayer Crop Science 
Yes/No  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Technology Fees  Technology fees charged on 
per acre basis for cotton, 
canola, and sugarbeet traits 
and included in per bag price 
for corn and soybeans.  The 
price for the Bt trait is 
generally higher than the 
Roundup Ready® trait.  In 
U.S., technology fee 
historically has included a 
pint of Roundup bundled 
with the seed at purchases. 
No separate technology fee 
for Knockout brand or 
Liberty Link system. 
Mycogen seed varieties have 
a per unit technology fee 
separate from seed and 
chemical costs. 
Technology fees charged on a 
per acre or per unit basis for 
YieldGard and Herculex I 
varieties licensed by 
Monsanto and Dow 
respectively to Dupont. 
No separate technology fee 
charged. 
No separate technology fee 
charged. 
Patent Protection  Monsanto gene technologies 
protected by U.S. patent law.  
Monsanto licenses the 
grower, allowing use of the 
technology but not ownership 
subject to the conditions in 
the technology agreement.  
Violators are subject to 
penalties/fines to cover 
damages. 
Liberty Link and Knockout  
gene technologies protected 
by U.S. patent law.  Syngenta 
licenses the grower, allowing 
use of the technology but not 
ownership subject to the 
conditions in the technology 
agreement.  Violators are 
subject to penalties/fines to 
cover damages. 
Dow AgroSciences 
(Mycogen) and Herculex I  
gene technologies protected 
by U.S. patent law.   Dow 
AgroSciences licenses the 
grower allowing use of the 
technology but not ownership 
subject to the conditions in 
the technology agreement.  
Violators are subject to 
penalties/fines to cover 
damages. 
Herculex I and YieldGard 
varieties protected by U.S. 
patent law. 
BASF works with a number 
of private and public 
institutions establishing 
varieties protected by U.S. 
patent law. 
Liberty Link crops protected 
by U.S. patent law. 
Product Warranty  
Policy/Notice 
Requirement 
Monsanto warrants product 
will perform properly in 
accordance with directions.  
Roundup Ready® Risk Share 
program in Canada will 
refund entire technology fee 
if crop is removed due to 
environmental reasons by a 
specified date within that 
crop year.  In U.S., has 
guarantees on net per acre 
benefit of certain varieties 
over conventional varieties. 
No limited warranty policy 
available. 
Dow AgroSciences warrants 
that the Mycogen gene 
technology licensed 
hereunder will perform as set 
forth in the product use guide 
when used in accordance 
with directions. 
Dow AgroSciences warrants 
that the Mycogen gene 
technology licensed will 
perform as set forth in the 
product use guide in 
accordance with directions. 
YieldGard varieties will 
perform as indicated if used 
in accordance with directions 
in the technology use guide. 
No limited warranty policy 
available. 
No technology agreement, so 




All grains, including YG 
corn, RR Corn, canola, 
sugarbeets, are  open to 
domestic use including on 
farm feed, feedlots, elevators 
that agree to accept the grain, 
or other approved domestic 
uses.  However, RR 
sugarbeets are not readily 
used due to most domestic 
buyers’ refusal to buy them. 
All Syngenta (NK) corn and 
soybeans are approved for 
human food and animal feed 
use in the U.S, Canada, EU, 
and Japan. 
Dow Agro requires that grain 
produced from Mycogen or 
Herculex I technologies is 
channeled to appropriate 
areas that accept GM crops.  
Grain must be consumed for 
feed or grain purposes in 
accepted markets. 
Grain can be channeled 
according to YieldGard and 
Herculex I channeling 
restrictions. 
Clearfield varieties that are 
not stacked with GM trait are 
considered non-GM and are 
available to export to any 
country as non-GM. 
Liberty Link crops are GM so 
only accepted in markets that 
accept the Liberty Link GM 
gene, so should only be 
distributed to these markets.  
Stewardship  Technology Use Guide 
outlines pollen flow 
prevention recommendations 
and additional refuge 
guidelines. 
Product use guide indicates 
non-Bt refuge crop should be 
similar to Bt variety.  1/4 
mile refuge zone distance is 
preferred over 1/2 mile 
distance. 
Product use guide indicates 
non-Bt refuge crop should be 
similar to Bt variety.  1/4 
mile refuge zone distance is 
preferred over 1/2 mile 
distance. 
Product use guide indicates 
non-Bt refuge crop should be 
similar to Bt variety.  1/4 
mile refuge zone distance is 
preferred over 1/2 mile 
distance. 
Clearfield system relies on 
herbicide application. 
Recommendations include 
herbicide and crop rotation 
practices to avoid weed 
resistance.   
No specific stewardship 
recommendations available. 
* Knockout is a Sygenta Seeds brand.  Liberty Link is from Bayer CropScience. 
**Dow AgroSciences Seeds produced by Mycogen Seeds, a subsidiary of Dow AgroSciences.  Herculex I is a DAS trademark.
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Refuge, Channeling, and Stewardship Requirements 
  The most common stipulation for GM crops involves a refuge requirement
2 for Bt crops.  
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) mandates that a Bt crop must have at least a 20% 
refuge of non-Bt corn in non-cotton growing areas and a 50% refuge of non-Bt corn in the cotton 
belt (Butzen, 2003).  Additionally, the producer agrees to allow firms to monitor the producer’s 
fields to ensure compliance.  Violators are subject to penalties including loss of technology 
growing rights and subsequent damages (Dow AgroSciences, 2003).  Producers must comply 
with refuge options that firms set forth in their Integrated Resistance Management (IRM) 
requirements.  Refuge zones in Bt crops decreases the occurrence of insect resistance by 
allowing susceptible insects to mate with the rare resistant ones to maintain Bt effectiveness in 
subsequent years (Butzen, 2003).   
The Center for Science in the Public Interest indicated that 19% of corn farms in Iowa, 
Minnesota, and Nebraska did not follow the refuge zone requirements (Farmers’ Independent 
Weekly, July 3, 2003).  This furthers the necessity to implement enforceable contracts including 
incentives to producers to comply with refuge zone requirements. 
In most grower agreements, firms outline patent protection laws associated with their 
particular crop.  Patent numbers are indicated, and agreements stipulate that the technology is 
protected by U.S. patent law and that the agreement represents a license to the grower to use but 
not own the gene.   
Due to the refusal by some markets of GM crops and their products, it is useful for 
technology firms to indicate available export markets.  Most agreements outline the importance 
of delivering to the appropriate marketing channels.  Some companies distribute a list of 
elevators that will accept GM products.  The product use guide also outlines other information 
such as restrictions on where the product is registered to be planted. 
Stewardship recommendations are common and describe potential use inclusive of 
herbicide and crop rotations, pollen flow considerations, and spraying application timing, among 
other recommendations.  Stewardship guidelines are not enforced, but producers are strongly 
urged to adhere to guidelines to ensure subsequent continuous benefits of the technology. 
Model Overview 
  A model is developed following Kingwell (2000) to evaluate incentive and contract terms 
on grower’s decision about prospective contract terms for GM and technology agreements for 
HRS wheat.  Kingwell (2000) discussed incentive design in GM cotton contracts in Australia.  
He modeled how a producer would react to contractual terms in GM crops.  Four different 
activity sets were proposed including legitimately adopting a GM crop, not adopting a GM crop, 
illegally adopting the GM crop, and improperly violating the GM crop by violating some of the 
contract terms (Figure 1).   
 
                                                 
2 Refuge requirements do vary across different crops but the basic requirement is to have a zone where non-GM 
crops are planted next to or in conjunction with GM crops to reduce the likelihood of pest resistance.   7
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Figure 1.  An Illustration of Farmer’s Decision Problem  
Source:  Kingwell (2000). 
 
  Producers have four adoption choices: grow non-GM wheat, legally adopt GM wheat, 
improperly adopt GM wheat, and illegally adopt GM, denoted by A, B, C, and D.  Following 
Latacz-Lohmann and Webster (1999), producers are considered amoral calculators, meaning that 
their chief interest is profit and they will abide by or violate technology agreements whenever it 
is profitable to do so.  As amoral calculators they select the most profitable of the four choices.   
  Adoption scenarios are representative of decisions that a producer would face if GM HRS 
wheat is commercialized.  A producer may opt to grow non-GM wheat.  Legal adopters acquire 
the GM seed legally and agree to a contract.  Improper GM adoption involves legally purchasing 
the seed and signing a technology agreement, but knowingly or unwittingly violating the contract 
terms.  Illegal GM  adoption occurs when a producer purchases the seed illegally and does not 
pay the technology fee.  Illegal adoption includes bin running GM seed from previous growing 
seasons.  There are numerous sources of risk related to the producer’s adoption decision.  Risks 
include prices, yields, wheat quality, and the monitoring and detection probability which 
influence the producer’s adoption decision.   
  GM wheat is represented strictly as Roundup Ready® hard red spring wheat (RR wheat).  
RR wheat is assumed to have an 11-14% yield advantage over conventional wheat, as well as 
lower chemical application costs (Gigax, 2003).  RR wheat adoption also encompasses signing a 
technology use agreement and a payment of a per acre technology use fee. 
  Stochastic simulation is used to determine adoption and compliance decisions for 
producers by accounting for production variability and shifting parameters.  Variability is 
implemented into the model through yield, price, wheat quality (protein, falling number, test 
weight, and vomitoxin), and input costs.  GM wheat volunteer costs account for the cost of   8
controlling Roundup Ready® volunteers in subsequent crop years.  Parameters evaluated include 
the effect of  risk aversion, technology fee, probability of violation detection, fines for violation, 
yield, price, and some alternate marketing sensitivities such as point-of-delivery technology fee 
pricing, non-GM wheat premiums, GM/non-GM co-mingling probability, and point-of-delivery 
testing frequencies. 
Mathematical Description of Model 
  The base case is a profit (total revenue – direct costs) function for choice i, where i = 
1...4, for non-adoption, legal adoption, improper adoption, and illegal adoption, respectively.  
The producer selects choice i with the highest expected profit.  To account for different risk 
aversion levels, utility of profit is calculated.  Costs include seed, herbicide, technology fee, 
volunteer control costs, fungicides, insecticides, fertilizer, crop insurance, fuel, repairs, drying, 
miscellaneous, and operating interest.  Indirect costs such as land and taxes are excluded because 
they are fixed and constant across crops and choices.  Price is a function of protein, falling 
number, vomitoxin, test weight, and transportation costs.  In the base case, price does not 
account for a non-GM premium.  The model is defined as: 
 E(Πi) = Yi * Pi – Ci – Ti  
where:  E(Πi) is equal to the expected profit of choice i, Yi is equal to the yield for choice i 
(bushels/acre), Pi is price for choice i ($/bushel), Ci is agronomic costs for choice i, and Ti 
represents  the technology costs for choice i. 
  Yield for GM wheat is assumed an 11-14% yield benefit (uniformly distributed) over 
conventional wheat due to superior agronomics.  Price Pi , is represented as: 






Vom*VS – T)] 
where,  P
M is the base price (Minneapolis in $/bushel), P
H is the premium for protein>14%, 
(random), Ci  is the protein content (correlated with yield), defined as 0 if <14 and 1 otherwise, 
P
L  is the discount for protein<14% (random), D
T is the discount for test weight (random),  TW is 
the test weight (if <58, then apply discount), D
FN is the falling number discount,  FN  is the 
falling number (defined at 1 if lower than limit of 300), D
Vom is the vomitoxin discount, and  VS 
is amount of vomitoxin (if greater than 2ppm). 
  Agronomic costs are defined as: 
 C i = ∑(Si,FUi, Hi, Ii, Fi, Ci, Ii, FLi, Ri, Di, OIi,  Misc.i) 
where, Si is the seed cost, FUi is fungicide costs, Hi is the conventional herbicide costs, Ii   is the 
insecticide costs, Fi is the fertilizer costs, Ci is the crop insurance costs, FLi  is fuel and labor 
costs, Ri  is cost of repairs, Di is drying costs, OIi is operating insurance, Misci  is miscellaneous 
costs, and all are in $/acre.  
  Conventional growers have no technology fee, legal adopters pay the technology fee, 
improper adopters unwittingly or knowingly pay a reduced portion of the technology fee, and   9
illegal adopters do not pay the technology fee but plant the GM wheat.  Technology costs are 
defined as: 
 T i =  (TFi – VC - p(Vi)*Fi),  
where TFi is the technology fee for choice i,VC is volunteer RR wheat control cost (assumed in 
only RR wheat adopter), p(Vi
.) is the probability of detection for scenario i (where i = IMP, ILL), 
and Fi is the fine for scenario i  (i = IMP, ILL). 
  Mechanisms that influence deterrence of improper and illegal use include increasing the 
probability of detection, p(V), and fine for violation V.  The size and type of technology fees 
charged are important components of the cost of growing GM wheat and varying these changes 
the expected profit from the legal adoption scenario.  The expected yield benefit from GM 
wheat, ease of use, and less herbicide use, will also have an effect on the adoption decision. 
  Technology use agreements typically require that the grower agree to be randomly 
audited for up to three years following the first planting of the technology.  The auditing 
procedure involves ensuring the correct number of reported acres and making sure no seed is 
being reused.  It may also involve checking that the grower applied Roundup® brand herbicide 
over the crop instead of a generic glyphosate substitute by contacting the retail where the 
herbicide was purchased.  Illegal users are more difficult to detect as they have not signed a 
technology agreement and the company presumably does not even have a record of their 
existence.   
  Detection probabilities are fixed in the base case, equal to those used by Kingwell (2000).  
Improper users face a 0.3 probability of being detected but illegal users face just a 0.06 
likelihood of being detected and represent the auditing or monitoring probabilities for both types 
of adopters.  A 0.3 probability indicates that a grower who improperly adopts GM wheat has a 
30% chance of being audited and detected for contract violation.  An illegal adopter has a much 
smaller likelihood, about 6% because the company is less likely to be aware of this producer 
because they have not signed a technology use agreement and the company has no record or 
knowledge of their growing operation.  Therefore, the likelihood of detecting an illegal user is 
low relative to an improper user.  In later sensitivities, these parameters are altered to determine 
their effect on the producer decision.   
  Improper users face a $10/acre fine for their violations if detected.  This fine was selected 
to reflect the most likely fine to cover loss of technology fee revenue due to incorrect acreage 
report.  Illegal users face the possibility of losing the net revenue realized from adopting the GM 
wheat illegally.  A steeper fine is allocated to deter illegal use because “brown bagging” seed is a 
much more serious offense than inaccurate reports on planted acres.   
  A utility function with a coefficient of relative risk aversion
3 (Fraser, 1991) was assumed 
for grower’s utility of profit to account for different risk aversion levels.  It is represented as 
function: 
                                                 
3 See Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995) for the difference between relative risk aversion and absolute risk aversion;  
relative risk aversion, R = -y*U’’(y)/U’(y) and absolute risk aversion, A = -U’’(y)/U’(y).   10
 U(Π) = Π
1-R/1-R ,  
where, 
  Π = profit, 
 U(Π) =  utility of profit 
  R = relative coefficient of risk aversion and,  1 0 ≤ ≤ R . 
  The base case for this model is located in Crop Reporting District (CRD) 2 in North 
Dakota.  This location was used because it is located in the North Central Region of North 
Dakota and represents a middle ground for average yields and prices between the western and 
eastern part of the state.  All of the data sources except the Roundup Ready® wheat yield benefit 
are from CRD 2.  The average yield benefit is observed across field trials from a variety of 
geographies (Gigax, 2003).  In the base case and all other sensitivities, the model is simulated at 
four different risk levels: risk neutral, and coefficients of relative risk aversion of 0.1, 0.5, and 
0.9.  A risk-neutral producer is expected to select the scenario with the highest expected profit.  
To account for risk aversion, expected profit is converted to expected utility for the three levels 
of risk aversion.  This concept is important because producers are likely to vary substantially in 
their risk attitudes and, therefore, vary in their propensity to violate contract agreements. 
Data Sources and Distributions 
  Table 3 provides a summary of the data sources used in this research. 
 
Table 3.  Data Sources 
 
             Model Component  Data Source 
Historic Wheat Yield  North Dakota Agricultural Statistics 
Service (1997-2001) 
Roundup Ready® Wheat Yield Benefit  Personal Communication, Monsanto, 2003 
Prices  Minneapolis Grain Exchange (1997-2001) 
Quality Data (test weight, protein, falling 
number, and vomitoxin) 
Department of Cereal Science and Food 
Technology, NDSU, (1997-2001) 
Quality Premiums and Discounts  Dahl, Wilson, Johnson, and Nganje (2001) 
Transportation Cost (CRD #2 Mpls.)  Burlington Northern Sante Fe 
Crop Production Costs  Crop Budgets, NDSU Extension Services, 
Swenson and Haugen (2002) 
 
  Distributions for the yield, price, and quality variables were determined using fitting 
capabilities in @Risk (Palisade, 2002a).  The distributions are summarized in Table 4.   
Distributions for premiums and discounts for test weight, protein, falling number, and vomitoxin 
are from Dahl, Wilson, Johnson, and Nganje (2001).  Table 5 summarizes the model parameters.   
  Values for risk aversion, technology fee, and fine severity were nominally assigned as a 
certain value and were simulated.  This is because these subsequent sensitivities were simulated 
to determine their effect on the producer decision.  The probability of detection was represented   11
as  a discrete distribution.  A producer who is an improper user is either detected or not detected 
by the technology company with the likelihood of being detected 0.30.  Illegal users have a 
similar detection probability, but at a 0.06 probability. 
 
Table 4.  Random Variable Distributions 
Variable Distribution  Mean  Std.Dev.  (α1, α2) (Min,  Max)  Correlation 
Yield Normal  24.26  3.38  NA  NA  NS
† 
Yield Increase GM Wheat  Uniform  NA  NA  NA  (.11, .14)  NS 
Market Price  Extvalue  3.60  0.27  NA  NA  NS 
Test Weight  Extvalue  58.67  0.37  NA  NA  NS 
Protein Beta  NA  NA  (0.14,  .20)  (14.60,  5.10)  NS 
Falling Number  Logistic  353.53  55.14  NA  NA  NS 




truncated at 0 
-0.04 0.05  NA  NA  NA 
Protein > 14% Premium*  Normal 
truncated at 0 
0.40 0.34  NA  NA  0.85  with 
protein 13% 
Protein < 14% Discount*  Normal 
truncated at 0 
-0.14 0.19  NA  NA  0.85  with 
protein 14% 
Falling Number Discount*  Normal 
truncated at 0 
-0.26 0.37  NA  NA  NA 
Vomitoxin Discount*  Normal 
truncated at 0 
-0.20 0.44  NA  NA  NA 
Source:  Distributions for premiums and discounts are from Dahl, Wilson, Johnson, and Nganje (2001). 
†NS – Not statistically significant (P= 0.05) 
 
 
Table 5.  Parameters  
Parameter  Base Case Value  Distribution 
Risk Aversion Coefficient  R = 0.5  NA 
Technology Fee  $8.00  NA 
Detection Prob. Improper  0.30  Discrete (Detected/not detected) 
Detection Prob. Illegal  0.06  Discrete (Detected/not detected) 
Fine Severity Improper  $10  NA 
Fine Severity Illegal  $Yield*Price  NA 
 
   12
Simulation Procedures 
  Simulations were conducted using @Risk (Palisade Corporation, 2000a).  One thousand 
iterations were conducted, at which time stopping criteria was met.  A base case model is 
developed to simulate the most likely situation.  Table 6 summarizes the base case assumptions.  
 
Table 6.  Base Case Assumptions 
Variable/Parameter Mean  Std. Dev  Distribution  Logic 
Yield (bushels/acre)  24.25  3.38  Normal  Mean and std.dev. in ND 
CRD 2 (1997-2001) 
Yield with RR wheat  11-14% benefit over 
conventional yield 
Uniform  Monsanto field trials 
Price  3.60  0.27  Extreme value  Minneapolis less freight 
(1997-2001) 
        
Quality  Quality variables equal 
to distributions accrued 
over period 1997-2001 
Test weight: Normal 
Protein: Betageneral 
Falling no: logistic 
Quality characteristics 
represent realistic 
distributions for quality 
premium/discounts 
Quality for RR Wheat  Same as above  Same as above  Results confirm quality is 
not different for RRW vs. 
non RRW 
Premium/Discount for 
Test Weight  $/bu 





Protein > 14% $/bu 




Protein < 14% $/bu 




Falling Number $/bu 
-0.26  0.37  Normal truncated at 0 
 
 
Premium for  Vomitoxin 
$/bu 
-0.20  0.44  Normal truncated at 0 
 
 
      
 Value     
Risk Aversion  0.5  NA  Relative coefficient of 
risk aversion 
Technology Fee $/acre  8.00  NA  Similar to value used in 
other crops 
Improper Use: Prob. 
detection and fine 
0.3 and $10/acre  NA  Prob. detection from 
Kingwell (2000) and fines 
derived as value to regain 
lost tech fee revenue plus 
small penalty 
Illegal Use: Prob 
detection and fines 
0.06, Net revenues 
 from RR Wheat 
NA  
   13
Results 
  There are several sources of risk in adopting a GM crop.  One is co-mingling risk in the 
delivery system that may impact the marketing opportunities for the producer.  Another is being 
detected by the technology company for improper or illegal actions.  Some producers may 
unwittingly violate terms outlined in the technology agreement and be subject to fines or 
penalties.  Incorporating a risk aversion parameter into the analysis accounts for how different 
producers will react to these situations.  
  The base case represents a likely situation and provides results for comparison.  Base 
case results for all risk attitudes are illustrated below (Table 7).  For risk neutral, the results are in 
profit/acre and are converted to utility of relative risk aversion for risk-averse producers.  The 
most profitable decision is illegal adoption assuming that the producer is not concerned with 
being detected for violating the contractual agreement.  However, the standard deviation for 
illegal adoption is higher than for legal adoption. 
 
Table 7.  Agronomic Decision Model Results 
R = 0 (Risk neutral)     
      Choice  Mean Profit ($/acre)  St. Dev ($/acre) 
No Adoption  20.22  14.87 
Legal Adoption  20.88  16.85 
Improper Adoption  20.77  17.29 
Illegal Adoption  26.37  18.45 
R = 0.1                            Expected Utility      Std. Dev of Expected Utility    
No Adoption  16.17                 11.04 
Legal Adoption  16.55                 12.44 
Improper Adoption  16.43                 12.78 
Illegal Adoption  20.57                 13.43 
R = 0.5 
No Adoption  8.09  3.93 
Legal Adoption  8.02  4.38 
Improper Adoption  7.90  4.54 
Illegal Adoption  9.26  4.44 
R = 0.9 
No Adoption  12.06  4.05 
Legal Adoption  11.68  4.60 
Improper Adoption  11.46  4.83 
Illegal Adoption  12.31  4.32 
    14
  For all levels of risk aversion, the highest utility is realized by selecting illegal adoption.  
For R = 0.1, legal adoption is second, but as the producer becomes more risk averse growing 
conventional wheat becomes more appealing.  The expected profit/utility relationship varies 
across risk aversion levels (Figure 2).  For risk neutral producers, illegal adoption yields the 
highest expected profit.  Aside from illegal adoption, there is a slight advantage to legal adoption 
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  Figure 2.  Expected Profit/Utility and Risk Attitude. 
  
Sensitivities 
  Sensitivities were conducted for several critical parameters including technology fee, 
detection probability, fine severity, point-of-delivery technology fee, non-GM premium, and 
point-of-delivery sampling.  Results are presented for each risk aversion coefficient of 0.5.  
Technology Fee 
  The technology fee is a key parameter in the producer decision model.  The technology 
fee was varied from $0-$12 to determine the impact of that value on the producer’s decision 
(Figure 3). 
 































Figure 3.  Expected Utility as Technology Fee Changes, R = 0.5.   
  If it is less costly to legally adopt a technology, most producers are likely to avoid the risk 
of improper and illegal use and adopt the technology.
4  As the technology fee passes the 
$8.00/acre level, the expected utility for not adopting GM wheat exceeds the legal adoption 
level.  Like legal adoption, improper adoption falls as technology fee increases.  This is because 
improper adopters still pay the technology fee on 90% of their acres, but also face the risk of a 
fine if detected.
5 
                                                 
4 This result has shown to be the case with GM cotton in Australia.  Monsanto’s introduction of Bt cotton at a high 
   price deterred many would-be adopters from growing it because the costs were too high.   
 
5 A number of assumptions need to be mentioned.  First, Roundup Ready® wheat is assumed to be introduced with 
  the intent of satisfying all potential growers.  There is likely to be producers who fall into the early innovator  
  segment and will adopt the technology regardless of the price.  Also, a technology company may skim the market 
  to achieve a certain level of adoption at a higher technology fee to gain high revenues at a lower overall market  
  share.  Additionally, this model assumes that any one producer will adopt the technology improperly or illegally  
  given a higher expected utility level.  There is likely to be a smaller percentage of potential violators.  Expectedly,  
  if only a small segment of producers consider improper or illegal use, then the price for the technology is likely to  
  be higher.     16
Probability of Detection 
  Technology companies can affect the level of detection of inappropriate use by 
monitoring to ensure they are complying with technology use requirements.  By increasing the 
likelihood of detecting improper and illegal users, technology companies can try to deter this use. 
A producer may be more hesitant to adopt improperly or illegally when there is a higher 
probability of being detected and then fined.   
   The probabilities of detection for improper use were varied from 0.10 to 0.50 and 0.04 to 
0.20 for illegal use.  Illegal use is less likely to be detected because these growers have not 
signed a technology use agreement with the company and monitoring is more difficult.  The 
probability of detection scale shows the probabilities for improper and illegal use (Figure 4).  No 
adoption and legal adoption expected utilities do not change across detection probabilities 

































Figure 4.  Expected Utility for No, Legal, Improper, and Illegal Adoption When Detection 
Probability is Varied,  R = 0.5. 
  
  Illegal adoption has the highest expected utility unless detection probabilities are at the 
extreme level of 0.2.  Due to the lack of information available to the technology company 
regarding illegal users, it is very difficult to detect them. Trying to audit 20% of producers who 
have never signed a technology agreement would be very costly and difficult to achieve.  A 
lower level of detection is more likely and practical.  Again, if the company believes that only a 
small percentage of producers are potential illegal users, than it may not be feasible to detect   17
these producers.  Increasing the detection level on illegal users does not significantly impact the 
producer decision, unless at the extreme end of the detection spectrum.  Therefore, if illegal use 
is a significant problem, then a technology company may want to look at other ways to 
discourage these actions.  Possibilities include paying the grain handler to run spot checks at the 
point-of-delivery. 
  Increasing the probability of detection deters improper adoption.  Improper users face a 
higher likelihood of detection than illegal users because they have signed a technology 
agreement and the technology company is more aware of information such as expected acres 
planted and location of those planted acres.  Large probabilities of detection are required to 
impact illegal users. Therefore, increasing the auditing probability should expose more improper 
users and reduce the occurrence of this action but is less effective at reducing illegal use. 
  An important assumption in this sensitivity involves the information available to the 
producer and the technology company.  The producer is likely to be unaware of the probability 
of being detected for improper use.  All he knows is that the company audits randomly over a 
time period.  A risk-averse producer is likely going to avoid this due to the uncertainty of being 
detected, but a less averse producer may attempt to use the technology inappropriately.  The 
technology company is unaware of the risk attitude of the producer and, therefore, does not have 
a method of focusing their auditing on high risk producers.  Additionally, the technology 
company is limited in its ability to detect illegal users even more so than improper users.  If 
improper use is a concern, a strategy for the technology company is to outline in their technology 
agreements a high likelihood of detection.  Even if this likelihood is not as high as the company 
implies, it sends a message to the producer that should deter improper use.  Ultimately, the 
degree of information available to both parties impacts the actions of each. 
Fines 
  Violation of the technology use agreement results in a fine.  To deter these actions, a 
higher fine can be administered to perpetrators who violate the technology use agreement in any 
number of ways including planting of saved seed, selling saved seed, or not reporting planted 
acres accurately.  A higher fine is expected to deter violation because it will drive down the 
expected utility for these scenarios.  This sensitivity varies the fines for improper and illegal use.  
Fines for improper use are varied from $10-$90 per acre.  Illegal use fines are varied from 
$84.36 (base case yield*price) to $160 per acre.  No adoption and legal adoption expected 
utilities are unchanged in these sensitivities as fines do not apply to them.   
  Results varied for improper and illegal adoption.  For the case of illegal adoption, 
expected utility declines very marginally as the fine level increases.  If illegal use is prevalent 
among producers, increasing the fines is not likely to effectively reduce these actions.  Improper 
adoption is deterred somewhat by increasing the fine.  An increase from $10-$30 per acre results 
in a lower expected utility for improper use.  A technology company that has a frequent 
occurrence of improper use could use fines as a successful deterrence of these actions.  However, 
it should be noted that signaling of high fines by the technology company may deter illegal and 
improper actions because producers are unlikely to know the probability of being detected.  If a 
strong message is sent, this alone could discourage illegal and improper actions.     18
  Concern exists for using this strategy to reduce improper use.  First, since many improper 
users are unwittingly violating the agreement, imposing a huge fine may cause more harm than 
good, especially if the fine exceeds the loss of revenue the company experienced.  Secondly, the 
technology company is unlikely to have fines exceed the actual lost revenue from improper 
reporting of acres planted.  Even though there is the argument that higher fines will act as an 
incentive to producers to be more careful in reporting their acres, the resulting loss of goodwill 
from being too hard on these producers may not be beneficial.  Ultimately, the seriousness of the 
problem will impact the decision on fine levels for the company.  If improper use is common, the 
resulting technology fee revenue may induce the company to amplify the fines.   
Point-of-delivery Technology Fee 
  An alternative pricing mechanism is a point-of-delivery pricing scheme. Typically, 
technology fees are deducted on a per acre basis.  Every technology adopter pays the same price 
for the technology regardless of the benefits or losses they achieve.  Under point-of-delivery 
pricing, the technology fee is deducted from the price at delivery.  Testing would be required on 
all shipments at the delivery point and some form of variety declaration would likely be required.  
The advantage of this strategy is that the technology company can extract the revenues from 
producers who “brown bag” seed.  Additionally, point-of-delivery pricing links technology fees 
to yield.  At higher yields, the total amount paid in technology fees is higher.  Producers pay 
based on the benefits they receive from the technology.  For this sensitivity, a per bushel point-
of-delivery discount was implemented on the price of all Roundup Ready® wheat bushels 
ranging from the $0.20-$0.60 per bushel at a risk aversion level of 0.5 (Figure 5). 
  The point-of-delivery pricing sensitivities are interesting.  The benefits of illegal adoption 
are eliminated with legal and illegal adoption being equally preferred.  Improper use would be 
the same if not for the assumption of lower input costs via generic herbicide (an illegal user may 
do the same thing and become an improper user).  At cheaper fees, adoption of the technology is 
more beneficial.  Unlike the per acre technology fee sensitivity, at higher fees no adoption 
becomes more appealing because the pricing strategy eliminates the benefits that illegal users 
had with the per acre pricing strategy.   
  Receiving technology fee rents at the point-of-delivery offers some key advantages and 
disadvantages.  First, loss of technology fee revenue is eliminated.  There is less need for 
auditing of producers because regardless of how much GM wheat is planted the technology fee is 
collected.  The costs and inconvenience of the auditing process are lower and revenue from the 
technology likely higher because more producers’ technology fees are collected.  This strategy 
would be particularly beneficial in markets where the regulation of GM crops is at a minimum, 
as with some developing countries where illegal plantings of GM crops are rampant.  Producers 
may also prefer this pricing strategy because it eliminates auditing that some producers see as an 
inconvenience and may reduce their concerns about unwittingly reporting acres incorrectly and 
being subsequently fined.   
  There are concerns with point-of-delivery pricing.  Although it is a method of collecting 
fees from all legal and illegal growers, it does little to deter “brown bagging” of seed.  Unless the 
technology company maintains its intensive auditing procedure (which it has less incentive to do 
now that it is collecting all technology fees), the integrity of the GM seed supply may be 
compromised.  Lack of monitoring of the GM seed supply may lead to complications including   19
higher rate of co-mingling of non-GM and GM wheat.  The impact of this strategy depends on 
the amount of illegal use.  If a small number of producers are growing seed illegally, then the 
seed supply concerns are less significant.  Additionally, this system requires a relationship 


































  Due to export constraints, and assuming a feasible segregation system, non-GM wheat 
may have a premium over GM wheat.  This sensitivity considers a range of premiums for non-
GM wheat and determines how changes in the value of non-GM wheat may influence the 
producer’s decision.  A range of $0.06-$1.00 premium for non-GM is considered.  Test samples 
are taken from all deliveries and there is a 2.5% co-mingling probability (Figure 6). 
  As the price premium for non-GM increases, the expected utility for conventional 
adoption of GM wheat increases.  These results indicate that illegal adoption will still have the 
highest expected utility up to about a $0.20 premium.  Beyond that, conventional wheat is 
preferred.   





























Figure 6.  Expected Utility When Non-GM Price Premiums Exist, R = 0.5.          
 
Roundup Ready® Wheat Yield Benefit 
  The 11-14% yield benefit for Roundup Ready® wheat was an assumption based on 
personal communications (Blackshaw and Harker, 2002).  More recent results suggest a 9-16% 
yield benefit for Roundup Ready® wheat and a $4/acre convenience factor (Kalaitzandonakes, 
Philips, and Suntornpithug, 2004.).  A sensitivity was conducted to account for this yield 
adjustment and convenience factor. 
  Results of the yield adjustment and convenience factor are concurrent with the base case, 
offering a similar interpretation of the producer’s decision.  Differing from the base case, though, 
is the increased comparative advantage of legal and improper adoption over the no adoption 
choice (Figure 7).  Legal and improper adoption becomes more appealing relative to no adoption 







































Figure 7.  Comparison of Expected Utility and Distribution of Yield Benefits for GM Variety, 
Risk Attitude Coefficient = .5. 
Stochastic Dominance Analysis of Choice Sets 
  Stochastic dominance is often used for analyzing risk in agriculture (McCarl, 1999).    
Originally developed by Meyer (1977a,b), stochastic dominance guarantees a choice set’s 
dominance as long as the risk aversion coefficient is within a given range.   
  There have been numerous applications of stochastic dominance in agriculture.  Dias, 
Helmers, and Eghball (1999) used generalized stochastic dominance to determine the risk 
efficiency of nine different technologies of land application.   Another application was in valuing 
soil test information for crop production (Lukin and Epplin, 1999).  A risk management 
application of comparing grazing versus feeder and option contracts in feeder cattle was 
conducted by Harrison, Bobst, Benson, and Meyer (1996).   
  Due to the risk and uncertainty in decision making in agriculture, Meyer’s methodology 
including, first-degree (FSD), second degree (SSD), third degree (TSD), as well as generalized 
stochastic dominance (GSD), is suitable for such decision making.  FSD is a stronger dominance 
criterion but has less restrictive assumptions.  SSD is higher order and GSD methodology 
differentiates between choice sets of data due to their risk efficiency.  FSD and SSD are 
incorporated together for GSD, therefore, facilitating implementation of risk aversion coefficient 
lower and upper bounds and comparing choice sets of data.  The methodology was used because 
it allowed behavioral assumptions by producers to be explicitly accounted and to provide a 
theoretically sound comparison of the risky alternatives.     22
  Outcomes for this model are based on expected profit or expected utility from a 
distribution set.  The producer selects the scenario with the highest expected profit or utility.  
Producer’s choices are measured across a range of risk aversion levels.
6 
   Generalized stochastic dominance incorporates first and second degree stochastic 
dominance and higher order stochastic dominance (Dahl, Wilson, Johnson, and Nganje, 2001).  
The methodology is useful because it allows the distribution of outcomes for the four scenarios 
to be compared to determine the best outcome, while accounting for risk attitudes of the 
producer.  Implementation was achieved using Astomdom, which determines rankings of 
scenarios and allowed sets of distributions to be compared, accounting for the risk in each 
distribution (Meyer, 1980).  The program ranks the distributions according to their risk 
efficiency and profit.  Preferences are based on how the program ranks the distributions. 
  Generalized stochastic dominance was used to analyze the results of the base case at 
technology fees ranging from $0 to $12 per acre.  Results are summarized in Table 9.  Results 
are similar to the original model in that illegal use is most preferred at most technology pricing 
levels.  GSD only showed legal use to be exclusively preferred when the technology does not 
cost anything.  However, at $2/acre, legal and illegal adoption is equally preferred, meaning that 
the risk efficient set includes legal and illegal adoption.  At every technology fee increment 
above $2/acre, illegal adoption is the most preferred with legal adoption being second, either by 
itself or with the alternative choices.  
  Two observations are reflected in the GSD results (Table 8).  Legal adoption is preferred 
at lower technology fees and illegal adoption is preferred at higher technology fee levels.  Also, 
at the extreme technology fee level of $12/acre, legal use is still at least as equally preferred to 
improper and no adoption.   






nd to Risk 
Efficient  Set 
3
rd to Risk 
Efficient Set 
Last to Risk 
Efficient Set 
$0 Legal  Improper  Illegal  No  Adoption 
$2 Legal, 
Illegal* 
Improper No  Adoption   
$4 Illegal  Legal  Improper  No  Adoption 
$8 Illegal  Legal  Improper  No  Adoption 
        









* Legal and illegal adoption are both within the risk efficient set. 
† Legal and no adoption are both second in the risk efficient set.  
†† Legal, no adoption, and improper adoption are all second to the risk efficient set.  
 
                                                 
6 Generalized stochastic dominance assumes absolute risk aversion coefficient, A= -U’’(y)/U’(y) (Zentner, Greene, 
Hickenbotham, and Eidman, 1981).     23
  Lower technology fee reduces illegal adoption.  Pricing the GM wheat technology low is 
a suggestive way of curbing illegal activities.  Legal adoption is at least second to the risk 
efficient set when technology fee levels are $2/acre.  Illegal use would be expected to be selected 
at most technology fee levels.  Effectively, it may not be feasible to deter all illegal use.  Rather, 
allow a small amount of it to occur and price at a higher level where revenues can be maximized. 
Determining the Optimal Technology Fee 
  The model was reformulated as a profit maximizing problem for the technology 
company.  Risk Optimizer (Palisade, 2000b) was used to determine the optimal technology fee 
for the base case.  Sensitivities were conducted on fines and probability of detection for improper 
use.  Risk Optimizer allows one to optimize a target cell subject to constraints on other 
parameters.    
  The technology company seeks to maximize their technology fee revenue subject to the 
producer selecting legal or improper adoption. 




i TF Max                 
where the technology fee represents the per-acre-revenue received by the technology company; 
s.t. 
  E(U)legal/improper > E(U) Illegal 
  The technology company is most concerned with eliminating illegal adoption first, because they 
still gain 90% of their technology fee revenue if producers are improper users.  Altering the fines 
and probability of detection will alter producer’s decision making and, therefore, alter the level 
of the technology fee.   
  Table 9 shows how changes in fines and probability of detection for improper use will 
influence the optimal technology fee, revenue from technology fees, and proportion of producers 
legally or improperly adopting GM wheat.  Only parameter changes for improper use are 
presented in the results.  This is because even at the upper tail of the parameter ranges for illegal 
use, the changes in technology fee were essentially zero.  Because improper use is closely tied 
with legal use, the overall proportion of adopters is combined for these two to signify the 
importance or deterring illegal use first.  
    Parameters for improper use are varied to determine the influence on the proportion of 
producers who switch from legal/improper to illegal.  The optimal technology fee remained 
constant at different fine and detection levels.  Although a constant technology fee was 
unexpected, the actual per acre amount received by the technology company changes with the 
parameters.  This value is less than the actual technology fee because it is the expected mean per 
acre revenue subject to the level the parameters are set at.  
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$10 $2.11  $1.35 0.70 0.30 
$30 $2.11  $1.57 0.83 0.17 
$50 $2.11  $1.90 0.95 0.05 














0.3 $2.11  $1.35  0.70 0.30 
0.4 $2.11  $1.16  0.62 0.38 
0.5 $2.11  $0.99  0.52 0.48 
0.6 $2.11  $0.81  0.43 0.57 
 
  As fines for improper use increase, the mean revenue to the technology company 
increases.  This is because the proportion of legal/improper users is increasing versus illegal 
users.  At higher fines for improper use, the company benefits two-fold.  First, it is deterring 
illegal adoption, as evident by the decreased proportion of illegal users.  Second, it also deters 
improper use because of the higher fine.  Consequently, the technology fee revenue is higher 
then at previous fine levels. 
  While increasing fines for improper use acted as a deterrent for improper use and reduced 
the amount of illegal use, increasing probability of detection reduces improper use but increases 
illegal use.   
  Fines and probability of detection for improper use both deter improper use.  However, 
the effect of varying these parameters results in two distinct implications for the technology 
company.  Increasing fines deters improper use and shifts growers from improper and illegal use 
to legal use, as evident by decreased proportion of illegal use and increased technology fee 
revenue.  However, increasing the probability of detection for improper use appears to shift 
producers to illegal use, therefore, hindering the effectiveness of increased probability of 
detection in thwarting in appropriate technology use. 
   The $2.11/acre technology fee is the maximum revenue the technology company can 
receive if its purpose is to deter illegal adoption.  Improper adoption still occurs at this level 
because allowing some improper adoption to occur will still provide the technology company 
with revenue.   Expending a high effort to deter all forms of contract violation, including 
improper adoption, may not be the optimal strategy for the technology company.  Instead, 
allowing some of the improper adoption to occur, while eliminating illegal use, can be carried 
out by applying the $2.11/acre technology fee.    
  Results from the generalized stochastic dominance analysis imply that legal adoption is at 
least preferred as much as improper and no adoption at technology fees up to $12/acre.  This 
implies that if illegal adoption is not a significant concern for the technology company, a higher   25
technology fee can be charged.  This differs in determining the optimal technology fee subject to 
the legal/improper adoption constraint because illegal adoption is assumed to be a problem and, 
therefore, the technology company’s pricing strategy is to price at the level that will deter illegal 
use.   
Summary 
  Contracts between the technology firm and producer are used to define technology use 
stipulations and pricing to ensure that the firm receives royalties for their technology.  A problem 
arises from inappropriate use or “piracy” of the firm’s technology by producers.  Contracts have 
to be designed to mitigate illegal and improper use of GM technology. 
  The purpose of this report was to evaluate contract terms to induce legal adoption of GM 
hard red spring wheat.  An analysis was conducted to compare four different GM wheat adoption 
scenarios: no adoption, legal adoption, improper adoption, and illegal adoption.  A producer was 
assumed to choose the scenario with the highest expected utility of profit.  Contract terms such 
as technology fee, probability of detection for contract violation, and fines for violation were 
adjusted to determine the effect on the producer’s adoption decision.  Stochastic simulation was 
used to account for the uncertainty and risk in the analysis, and generalized stochastic dominance 
was conducted to compare the choice sets.  A final analysis was conducted to determine the 
optimal technology fee when the objective is to maximize the technology firm’s revenue.  
Results are summarized in Table 11. 
  The level of technology fee is most critical to the adoption decision.  Charging too high a 
price will induce illegal and improper adoption.  A point-of-delivery technology fee is an 
alternative in addition to eliminating the advantage of illegal use because all produces pay the 
technology fee if they deliver GM wheat.  Point-of-delivery pricing mitigates illegal use but 
producers will still react to the price level by only adopting if the price is low enough.   
  Fines for detection and detection probability have variable impact on the producer’s 
decision.  Increasing fines does not deter illegal use and is marginally effective at decreasing the 
occurrence of improper use.  Similarly, an increase in the monitoring deters illegal use 
marginally and substantially decreases improper use. 
  Technology firms are unlikely to continue to invest in GM seed technology if their efforts 
are not compensated.
7  Contracts can be designed to deter illegal and improper use of GM crop 
technology without discouraging adoption of the crop.  Monitoring and auditing procedures have 
to be feasible.  If there are only a small number of producers who are illegally adopting the 
technology, then it may not be in the firm’s best interest to exert a substantial amount of effort to 
deter these actions.  It is important not to undermine the value of signaling on the part of the 
technology firm.  A clear message can be directed to the producer indicating that contract 
violators will be punished with a substantial penalty or fine.  Without revealing the detection 
probability, firms can discourage inappropriate technology use through the credible threat of 
punishment for violation. 
                                                 
7 As evidenced in recent developments in Argentina where Monsanto has halted sales of Roundup Ready® soybeans 
due to illegal use and the ongoing Supreme Court case in Canada between a Saskatchewan farmer and Monsanto 
over illegal use.   26
Table 11.  Summary of Impacts on Contract Terms on GM Adoption 
Sensitivity  Effect on GM wheat adoption 
Risk aversion  Higher risk averse producers tend to avoid 
illegal and improper use.  Legal and no 
adoption is more appealing to the more risk 
averse producers. 
Technology fee  At lower fees, legal adoption is best. 
Detection probability for improper/ illegal 
use 
Improper use declines substantially with 
increase in probability detection, illegal use 
declines marginally. 
Fines for improper/illegal use  Improper use declines with increased fines 
but only marginal decrease in illegal use. 
Point-of-delivery technology fee  Eliminates illegal use.  
Non-GM  price premium  Higher non-GM premium increases 
likelihood of conventional wheat adoption. 
 
  Increasing fines is a better deterrent to illegal and improper use than increasing 
probability of detection is when maximizing technology fee revenue is the company’s objective.  
This suggests that a technology company, when faced with problems involving illegal use, may 
be able to increase their revenue without actually changing the price of the technology fee.  
Raising the price of the technology may influence legal adopters to switch to improper or illegal 
adoption as previous results in this analysis suggest.   
  Results of this analysis can also be used to evaluate contracts by buyers wanting non-GM 
wheat.  By looking at the size of the premium necessary to induce non-GM adoption, buyers can 
develop pricing terms as an incentive to producers to grow non-GM wheat.   27
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